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THE PROPHYLACTIC FIFTH AMENDMENT
TRACEY MACLIN∗

JUSTICE KENNEDY: So beating a prisoner to compel a—a statement is
not a Fifth Amendment violation.
DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL PAUL CLEMENT: That’s right,
Justice Kennedy. It’s not a Fifth Amendment violation. . . .
....
JUSTICE KENNEDY: What about the order of a trial judge in a civil case
who orders the witness held in contempt and confined unless he testifies,
and—and there’s a valid Fifth Amendment privilege that the judge is
overlooking? No Fifth Amendment violation there?
CLEMENT: No. I don’t think there’s a Fifth Amendment—I don’t think
there’s a complete Fifth Amendment violation. The courts intervene there
to protect the privilege.1
INTRODUCTION
The right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause
appears straightforward: no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.”2 Despite its basic terms, historical pedigree, and
well-known status as a constitutional right, the public’s understanding of what
is protected by the Fifth Amendment is often ill informed, and even sophisticated
lawyers are not always capable of explaining the scope and application of the
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Professor of Law, Joseph Lipsitt Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of
Law. Thanks to Al Alschuler for his comments after reading a draft of this Article. And thanks
to Maria Savarese and Christian Garcia for their excellent research and editing skills.
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (No. 011444).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. While the Court, over a century ago, described the words of the
Self-Incrimination Clause as “concise[],” Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548 (1897),
and “generic,” id. at 543, one student of the provision has rightly noted that application of the
clause “can be deceptively complex,” STEVEN M. SALKY, THE PRIVILEGE OF SILENCE: FIFTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, at ix (2009); cf. ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, IS THERE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT? COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11, at 28-29 (2008) (noting that some of the amendment’s terms
“are relatively simple to interpret,” while other parts of the provision are subject to differing
meanings).
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right.3 Indeed, supporters of the right not “to be a witness against [one]self”4
have not been particularly adept at explaining why America needs the Fifth
Amendment.5 This uncertainty about the scope of the privilege, as well as the
inability to persuasively defend it, may be due to the fact that many Americans
do not consider the Fifth Amendment one of the “respectable freedoms”—like
the right to freedom of speech or freedom of religion.6 Too many people
3 The best example of the public’s misunderstanding of the Fifth Amendment is the view
that persons enjoy a “right to remain silent” when questioned by police. As explained in a
recent article, Americans’ understanding of what the Fifth Amendment protects is deeply
flawed. See Tracey Maclin, The Right to Silence v. The Fifth Amendment, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 255, 260-63 (explaining why the Supreme Court’s rulings in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760 (2003), Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), and Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct.
2174 (2013), show that the Fifth Amendment does not protect all persons during their
interactions with police and does not always protect silence).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Judges and lawyers often refer to the right embodied in the Fifth
Amendment as the “privilege” against compelled self-incrimination. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
United States, 526 U.S. 314, 316 (1999). As Leonard Levy rightly notes, this characterization
is unfortunate. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, at xv (2d ed. 1986)
(explaining that “[a]lthough the right against self-incrimination originated in England as a
common-law privilege, the Fifth Amendment made it a constitutional right, clothing it with
the same status as other rights, like freedom of religion, that we would never denigrate by
describing them as mere privileges”); id. at xvi (“The right or ‘privilege’ against selfincrimination was not a phrase known to the framers of the Fifth Amendment. They spoke
more broadly of the right of a person not to be a witness against himself. The first state bill of
rights spoke of one’s right not to be compelled to give evidence against himself.”).
Nonetheless, throughout this Article I will use the term “privilege” to describe the right
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
5 See, e.g., ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955) (“A good many
efforts have been made to rationalize the privilege, to explain why it is a desirable or essential
part of our basic law. None of the explanations is wholly satisfactory.”); David Dolinko, Is
There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1147
(1986) (arguing that contemporary efforts to justify the privilege are unconvincing, and stating
that the privilege “can be explained by specific historical developments, but cannot be
justified either functionally or conceptually” (footnote omitted)); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some
Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 320 (1991)
(“In spite of the many Supreme Court opinions that laud the privilege in reverential terms, the
precise purpose it serves has never been adequately explained or defended.”); Mickey Kaus,
The Fifth Is Now Obsolete, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1986, at A19 (arguing that there is no
persuasive justification for the privilege, and that the amendment’s original purpose to protect
religious and political freedoms can be served “by other, far less destructive, constitutional
rules”).
6 LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 19 (1983) (“Americans have always
been quick to defend what are considered the respectable freedoms: press, religion, assembly.
But those accused of crime have had few defenders. Few men have rushed to uphold the
constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure or against compelled selfincrimination when it was a kilo of heroin that was seized or a confession forced from a father
accused of bludgeoning his daughter to death.”).
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associate the Fifth Amendment with criminals, and believe that only guilty
individuals invoke the Fifth.7
On the other hand, despite some misunderstanding about the constitutional
nuances of the Fifth Amendment, informed citizens realize that the privilege bars
law enforcement officers from using coercion to compel an incriminating
statement from a suspect. As some have observed, “[t]he heyday of what came
to be known in American culture as the ‘third degree’—the infliction of physical
pain or mental suffering to obtain information about a crime—was the first third
of the twentieth century.”8 Despite what police officials said or thought about
the third degree in the 1930s,9 the use of coercion, whether physical or
psychological, was (and still is) condemned by most Americans.10 And, if a legal
basis were needed to support condemnation of police coercion to obtain
incriminating statements, many folks would point to the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.

7 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (“Too many, even those who
should be better advised, view th[e] privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily
assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the
privilege.”); LEVY, supra note 4, at vii (acknowledging the public perception that when
someone invokes the Fifth Amendment, the person “seems to be saying that he has something
to hide, making the Fifth Amendment appear to be a protection of the guilty,” and observing
that “[w]ithout doubt the right against self-incrimination is the most misunderstood,
unrespected, and controversial of all rights”); Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the
New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 193 (“The persistent inability of courts and scholars to
dispel the doubts surrounding the privilege is attributable to the ambivalence of most
Americans—including the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States—when they
think of the privilege. . . . [M]any are reluctant to accept the logical consequences of a
generous interpretation of the privilege, particularly in view of the shelter it affords the guilty
and the nonconformist.”).
8 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 505 (14th ed. 2015).
9 After the publication of the Wickersham Commission Report in 1931, which documented
pervasive use of the third degree in some police departments, see NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW
OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931), one scholar
noted the standard law enforcement reaction to allegations that the police used third degree
tactics. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 70 (2008) (noting
that the Wickersham Report “was greeted by the police with two answers which they regarded
as conclusive: first, there wasn’t any third degree; and second, they couldn’t do their work
without it” (quoting DONALD L. SMITH, ZACHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND
LAW 10 (1986))).
10 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 506-07 (“The Wickersham Report and other widely
publicized accounts of the third degree led to a fundamental distrust of the police—an attitude
that made it very difficult to obtain convictions. Although some of their colleagues hotly
disputed the findings of the Wickersham Commission, police reformers realized that the third
degree ‘had become a black mark on the image of policing’ and that they had to abolish it.”
(quoting LEO, supra note 9, at 78)); see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 47 (“The visual
image of a violation of the privilege for most Americans remains the police beating or
torturing a confession out of a person in their custody: the old ‘third degree.’”).
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Tellingly, those who instruct police detectives on the proper methods of
interrogation tell their pupils that coercion and coercive questioning is forbidden
by the Constitution. Police interrogation manuals and other training materials
are “the medium through which investigators acquire their working knowledge
of the constitutional law of criminal procedure, the primary source of external
restraint on their interrogation practices.”11 Indeed, the author of the first
published police interrogation manual admonished his readers never to utilize
third-degree tactics.12 And Fred Inbau, who wrote the first edition of what
became “the most widely read and best known police interrogation manual in
American history,”13 unequivocally opposed the use of coercion during police
interrogation.14 Today’s interrogation manuals similarly proscribe using
coercion or its equivalent during interrogation.15
Of course, the Supreme Court, until very recently, had not disagreed with the
view that the Constitution bars police from using coercion while interrogating a
suspect. In a series of cases from the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s, the Court
reversed state court convictions where police utilized coercion to obtain
incriminating statements from suspects, and those statements were later
admitted at trial.16 Concededly, the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause as the constitutional basis for reversing state court
convictions. The Due Process Clause provided the basis for judgment in these
cases, in large part, because the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause
was not applicable to the states during this time.17 Although the Fifth

11

LEO, supra note 9, at 109.
W.R. KIDD, POLICE INTERROGATION 46-47 (1940) (asserting that “[t]he third degree
should never be used by the police,” and noting that “[p]erhaps the greatest harm done by the
third degree methods lies in the eventual harm to the department”).
13 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 507.
14 FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 185 (3d
ed. 1953); see also FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 27 (1962); Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation—A Practical Necessity, 52 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 16, 20 (1961).
15 See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 212-16
(4th ed. 2001).
16 The first case where the Court reversed a state court conviction because police coerced
a confession was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Brown and some of the other
early cases are discussed in KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 508-15, and GEORGE C. THOMAS
III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND
144-59 (2012).
17 The Court made the privilege applicable to the States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3
(1964). While the Court was announcing constitutional restraints on state police
interrogations, it “had little occasion [to address] . . . the constitutional issues in dealing with
federal interrogations.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966). This was because
Congress had adopted Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required
that suspects held by federal officers be promptly taken before a federal magistrate, see FED.
R. CRIM. P. 5(a), and the Court’s implementation of that Rule in McNabb v. United States,
12
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Amendment did not dictate the judgment in these cases, there was no reason to
believe that the Justices were divided over the question of whether the Fifth
Amendment barred coercion during police interrogation, or in any other legal
proceeding, formal or informal. As Justice White’s dissenting opinion in
Escobedo v. Illinois18 observed: the Fifth Amendment “addresses itself to the
very issue of incriminating admissions [obtained by police during custodial
interrogation] . . . and resolves it by proscribing only compelled statements.”19
Once the amendment became applicable to state officials, even Justices opposed
to the result in Miranda understood that the Fifth Amendment barred police
coercion during the interrogation process.20
This consensus that the Fifth Amendment bars government officials, whether
it be the police, a judge, or legislative committee, from using coercion to demand
incriminating answers was toppled after the Court’s ruling in Chavez v.
Martinez.21 In that case, six Justices agreed that the Fifth Amendment does not
protect against government use of coercion to induce incriminating responses;
when government officials employ compulsion to obtain statements, a violation
of the Constitution occurs only if those statements are used in a criminal case.22
318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), made reliance on
the Fifth Amendment unnecessary in federal cases. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463.
18 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
19 Id. at 497 (White, J., dissenting).
20 Cf. Justice Byron R. White, Recent Developments in Criminal Law, Address Before the
Conference of Chief Justices in Council of State Governments at the 19th Annual Meeting of
the Conference of Chief Justices (Aug. 3, 1967), in KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 669-70
(explaining that while reasonable men may differ about the answer, the question presented in
Miranda—whether a person under arrest is subject to compulsion when questioned by police
in the station house—“is a perfectly straightforward one under the Fifth Amendment,” and
the answer given by Miranda “is plainly a derivative of Malloy v. Hogan, [which] appl[ied]
the Fifth Amendment to the States”).
21 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
22 In Chavez, Justice Thomas wrote for four Justices when he stated: “We fail to see how,
based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Martinez can allege a violation of this right, since
Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness against himself
in a criminal case. . . . The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot support
the . . . view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without more, violates the
Constitution.” Id. at 766-67 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Justice Souter, joined by
Justice Breyer, appeared to agree with the plurality’s view on this point, although Justice
Souter’s view is not clear. See id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“As [the
plurality] points out, the text of the Fifth Amendment . . . focuses on courtroom use of a
criminal defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony, and the core of the guarantee
against compelled self-incrimination is the exclusion of any such evidence.”). While Justice
Souter’s opinion discussed the scope of the privilege and concluded that Martinez did not
state a valid § 1983 claim for a Fifth Amendment violation, he offers a legal analysis different
from that proffered by Justice Thomas. See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
Ultimately, however, one could conclude that a majority of the Justices in Chavez agreed that
coercive police interrogation that produces incriminating statements does not violate the Fifth
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Interestingly, before Chavez, the Court had not squarely confronted the issue of
when a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs.23 Over fifty years ago, the
Court acknowledged that the right against self-incrimination “has two primary
interrelated facets: The Government may not use compulsion to elicit selfincriminating statements; and the Government may not permit the use in a
criminal trial of self-incriminating statements elicited by compulsion.”24 Back
then, the “conceptual difficulty of pinpointing” when a constitutional violation
occurs—when the Government employs compulsion, or when the compelled
statement is actually admitted at trial—was unimportant.25 Chavez forced the
Court to decide when the violation occurs. Six Justices gave us their answer: a
violation occurs when compelled incriminating statements are introduced in a
criminal case. Coercion during police interrogation does not violate the Fifth
Amendment.26 This answer not only resolved the Fifth Amendment claim raised
in Chavez, but it also left no doubt that Americans do not enjoy a right to remain
silent. Nor do persons, after Chavez, enjoy a substantive right to be free from
coercive governmental questioning, or a constitutional protection against
penalties or forms of punishment short of the initiation of a criminal case, such
as a contempt order from a judge for failing to answer an incriminating question.
When carefully examined, Chavez is a troubling ruling from several vantage
points. The most disquieting aspect of Chavez, however, is Justice Thomas’s
effort to remake Fifth Amendment law. As will be explained below, Justice
Thomas’s opinion in Chavez is ultimately an effort to transform the SelfIncrimination Clause from a substantive right to a judge-made prophylactic rule.
Part I of this Article describes Chavez and the reasoning behind the Court’s Fifth
Amendment ruling.27 Part II critiques the legal analysis of Justice Thomas’s and

Amendment, unless those statements are admitted at a later prosecution. See John T. Parry,
Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation After
Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 763 (2005) (noting that under the plurality’s analysis,
“[t]he privilege is irrelevant as a source of enforceable rights if the government never seeks
to introduce the confession”).
23 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 31 (“There is no direct precedential support for the
conclusion that the privilege against self-incrimination is violated at the point when
compulsion is employed, rather than at the point when its fruits are admitted at the criminal
trial. But nor is there any direct support for the opposite view. It was an open question prior
to [Chavez].”).
24 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964) (citation omitted).
25 Id.
26 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770 (plurality opinion); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment).
27 The Justices also addressed whether Officer Chavez’s actions violated Martinez’s right
to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. A majority of the Justices could
not agree on the disposition of Martinez’s substantive due process claim. Ultimately, Justice
Souter wrote for a majority of the Court, in Part II of his opinion, when he ruled that Martinez
was entitled to a remand to determine the scope and merits of his substantive due process
claim. Id. at 779-80 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).

2017]

THE PROPHYLACTIC FIFTH AMENDMENT

1053

Justice Souter’s opinions in Chavez. While Justices Thomas and Souter insist
that their reasoning was commanded by the Court’s precedents, the facts in
Chavez not only confronted the Court with a novel legal issue, but also, as the
discussion below will show, the Court’s precedents pointed in a different
direction than the result embraced by either Justice. Finally, Part III identifies
some of the consequences for Fifth Amendment law under the logic of Chavez.
PART I
The facts in Chavez are tragic. Oliverio Martinez was shot and severely
wounded during a confrontation with police.28 Two officers were questioning a
person when Martinez approached on his bicycle.29 The officers ordered
Martinez “to dismount, spread his legs, and place his hands behind his head.”30
Martinez obeyed.31 Martinez was frisked and a knife was discovered in his
waistband.32 A struggle then ensued, with the parties disagreeing about what
happened next.33 What is undisputed is that one of the officers yelled, “‘He’s got
my gun!’”34 The other officer then shot Martinez several times.35 The shooting
left Martinez “permanently blinded and paralyzed from the waist down.”36
A patrol supervisor, Officer Ben Chavez, who was not involved in the
shooting, accompanied Martinez to the hospital and later questioned him over a
forty-five-minute period while he was under arrest and receiving treatment for
his wounds at a hospital.37 Officer Chavez gave no Miranda warnings before
questioning, nor did he stop when Martinez protested that he was in extreme
pain and requested that the interrogation end.38 Martinez eventually made
incriminating statements to Officer Chavez, but no formal proceedings were
ever brought against Martinez, as he was not charged with a crime.39
Martinez filed a federal civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Officer Chavez, claiming that the coercive questioning at the hospital
violated the Fifth Amendment.40 Two lower federal courts ruled that Officer
28

Id. at 764 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 763.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 763-64.
33 Id. at 764.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 764-65. Generally speaking, when a plaintiff files a § 1983 claim against a state
official, the official may be entitled to qualified immunity, which would bar the lawsuit. See,
e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009). Whether the official is entitled to
qualified immunity turns on a two-pronged inquiry: a court must consider whether the facts
29
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Chavez was not entitled to qualified immunity because he violated Martinez’s
clearly established constitutional right not to be subjected to coercive
interrogation.41 Specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled
that Officer Chavez’s coercive questioning violated Martinez’s Fifth
Amendment rights “[e]ven though Martinez’s statements were not used against
him in a criminal proceeding.”42 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that
Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right was clearly established constitutional law
because a reasonable police officer “would have known that persistent
interrogation of the suspect despite repeated requests to stop violated the
suspect’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from coercive
interrogation.”43
A. Setting the Table
The reasoning and result in Chavez were forecast by the federal government’s
amicus brief supporting Officer Chavez. Put succinctly, the Solicitor General
told the Justices that the Fifth Amendment does not control the actions of police
officers. The constitutional privilege is a trial right; it does not govern what
officers do in the field.44 According to the Solicitor General, the “sole concern”
of the Fifth Amendment is to afford protection against being forced to give

alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so, whether that
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 200-01 (2001). It should be noted that lower courts are no longer strictly circumscribed
to the precise order of the Saucier two-step inquiry, and may exercise their discretion in
resolving either of the two inquiries before the other. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. But see
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 706-07 (2011) (recognizing such discretion, but cautioning
that lower courts “should think hard, and then think hard again” before abandoning Saucier’s
sequential two-step framework).
41 See Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001); Martinez v. City
of Oxnard, No. CV-98-9313-FMC(AJWX), 2000 WL 35502983, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1,
2000).
42 Martinez, 270 F.3d at 857.
43 Id. at 858.
44 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (No. 01-1444) (“Numerous distinctive aspects of Fifth
Amendment doctrine confirm that the Self-Incrimination Clause provides a ‘trial right’ for
criminal defendants, rather than a limit on the primary conduct of law-enforcement officers
in the field.” (citations omitted)). The petitioner’s brief made a similar argument. See Brief
for Petitioner at 13, Chavez (No. 01-1444) (“Only if and when an individual is compelled to
be a ‘witness’ against himself ‘in a[] criminal case’ is there a violation of the Compulsory
Self-Incrimination Clause. And that final but crucial step occurs only if the compelled
statement is used, either directly or derivatively, in an actual prosecution.”). Petitioner’s brief
also argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “does not give an
individual a freestanding—let alone an unqualified—‘substantive right to silence.’” Id. at 2223 (quoting Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1248 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also id. at 29-31.
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testimony to the infliction of penalties affixed to criminal acts.45 To illustrate the
limited role of the Fifth Amendment, the Solicitor General contrasted the
differing functions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Fourth
Amendment, which guarantees a right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures, controls the actions of police in the field.46 Because officers sometimes
confront exigent circumstances while on patrol, certain Fourth Amendment rules
are relaxed when police encounter an emergency.47 By contrast, according to the
Solicitor General, “[i]n the Fifth Amendment context, the need for such an
exemption is reduced, because the Amendment itself does not directly regulate
primary police conduct.”48 Finally, during the oral argument in Chavez, at the
start of his presentation, Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement told the Justices
that “the privilege against self-incrimination is not a direct limit on the primary
conduct of . . . law enforcement officers.”49 A few moments later, Clement
described the Court’s decision in United States v. Balsys50 as standing for the
proposition that “the self-incrimination privilege is unusual because it’s not
purely and simply binding on the Government. It doesn’t say that in all contexts,
the Government cannot coerce confessions.”51
B. The Opinion
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez followed the direction of the federal
government’s brief.52 First, relying on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Justice
Thomas explained that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right was not violated
because he “was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a
witness against himself in a criminal case.”53 To support this conclusion, Justice
Thomas found that police interrogation is not part of a “criminal case” under the
Fifth Amendment. Justice Thomas asserted that a “criminal case” for Fifth
Amendment purposes “at the very least requires the initiation of legal

45 See Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 15 (quoting Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 17.
50 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
51 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 20. In Balsys, the Court ruled that a
resident alien subpoenaed to testify about his wartime activities in Europe between 1940 and
1945 and his immigration to the United States in 1961, could not invoke the Fifth Amendment
to refuse to answer because he feared prosecution by the foreign governments of Lithuania
and Israel. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 669. There, the Court held that “concern with foreign
prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause.” Id.
52 Three members of the Court—Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice
Scalia—joined Justice Thomas’s opinion analyzing and resolving Martinez’s Fifth
Amendment claim. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 762 (2003).
53 Id. at 766 (plurality opinion).
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proceedings.”54 Obviously, no legal proceedings had commenced against
Martinez.55 Although Thomas did not address “the precise moment when a
‘criminal case’ commences” for Fifth Amendment purposes, he was certain that
“police questioning does not constitute a ‘case’ any more than a private
investigator’s precomplaint activities constitute a ‘civil case.’”56 While
compelled statements induced by police cannot be used at a defendant’s criminal
trial, “it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the SelfIncrimination Clause occurs.”57 Justice Thomas also explained that Martinez
was “never made to be a ‘witness’ against himself in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements were never
admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case.”58 Therefore, Justice
Thomas maintained, the text of the amendment is not violated by “the mere use
of compulsive questioning, without more.”59
Second, Justice Thomas explained that the Court’s precedents did not support
finding that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right was violated. Justice Thomas
observed: “It is well established that the government may compel witnesses to
testify at trial or before a grand jury, on pain of contempt, so long as the witness
is not the target of the criminal case in which he testifies.”60 According to Justice
Thomas, the Court’s prior cases established that “mere coercion does not violate
the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements
in a criminal case against the witness.”61 He noted that persons can be compelled
to provide incriminating statements “so long as those statements (or evidence
derived from those statements) cannot be used against the speaker in any
criminal case.”62 In fact, Justice Thomas compared Martinez’s situation to the
“immunized witness forced to testify on pain of contempt.”63 To be sure, the
immunized witness knows that his compelled testimony cannot be used against
him at a later trial; Martinez, however, lacked such knowledge.64 That
difference, in Justice Thomas’s judgment, did not mean Martinez suffered a
constitutional harm—both the immunized witness and Martinez were subjected

54

Id.
Id. at 764.
56 Id. at 767.
57 Id. at 767 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 767-68 (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984); Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972)).
61 Id. at 769.
62 Id. at 768 (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 602-04 (1896); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at
458; United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1998)). Justice Thomas also cited the
“penalty cases,” notably Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973), and Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768.
63 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 769.
64 Id.
55
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to governmental compulsion. Thus, as Justice Thomas put it, the immunized
witness’s ex ante knowledge that his compelled testimony cannot be used
against him, “does not make the statements of the immunized witness any less
‘compelled.’”65
Justice Thomas acknowledged that where immunity has not been granted, the
compelled statements of witnesses testifying before a grand jury or legislative
committee cannot be used at a later trial.66 He also recognized that officials
cannot punish public employees or government contractors “to induce them to
waive their immunity from the use of their compelled statements in subsequent
criminal proceedings.”67 However, under Justice Thomas’s view of the Fifth
Amendment, “immunity is not itself a right secured by the text of the [Fifth
Amendment], but rather a prophylactic rule” the Court has announced to enforce
it.68
To support his understanding of how the Fifth Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination in criminal cases, Justice Thomas drew an
important distinction between assertion of one’s Fifth Amendment rights and
violation of the right itself. According to Justice Thomas, a person can assert the
Fifth Amendment in any proceeding.69 However, “a violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been
compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.”70 Therefore,
Justice Thomas explained, the Court has created “an evidentiary privilege that
protects witnesses from being forced to give incriminating testimony, even in
noncriminal cases, unless that testimony has been immunized from use and
derivative use in a future criminal proceeding before it is compelled.”71 But
judicially created rules designed to protect a “constitutional right,” do not, under
Justice Thomas’s view, “extend the scope of the constitutional right itself.”72
Offering two examples of how the Fifth Amendment operates, Justice
Thomas observed that in the “penalty cases,” the Fifth Amendment may be
“asserted” by a witness in a noncriminal proceeding or setting “in order to
safeguard the core constitutional right defined by the Self-Incrimination
Clause—the right not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against oneself.”73 Similarly, the Miranda warnings and the rule mandating that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda be excluded from criminal

65

Id.
See id. at 771.
67 Id. at 768 n.2 (citing Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 280 (1968); Turley, 414 U.S. 70).
68 Id.
69 See id. at 770.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 770-71 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972); Maness v.
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1975)).
72 Id. at 772.
73 Id.
66
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proceedings, are prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the “right
protected by the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause—the admission into
evidence in a criminal case of confessions obtained through coercive custodial
questioning.”74 Applying this logic, Justice Thomas concluded that because
Martinez was not compelled to be a “witness” against himself in any “criminal
case,” his Fifth Amendment claim has no merit.75
Justice Souter wrote an opinion in which he agreed with Justice Thomas’s
analysis of the Fifth Amendment, although he believed that the Court’s ruling
“requires a degree of discretionary judgment greater than Justice Thomas
acknowledges.”76 Justice Souter subscribed to Justice Thomas’s reading of the
text of the amendment, which “focuses on courtroom use of a criminal
defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony.”77 According to Justice
Souter, the “core of the guarantee” of the Fifth Amendment is the exclusion of
any coerced statement from the “courtroom.”78 But because Martinez sought a
monetary remedy for Officer Chavez’s coercive conduct, Souter maintained, his
claim is “well outside the core of Fifth Amendment protection.”79
That Martinez’s claim falls out of the “core” of Fifth Amendment protection,
however, did not necessarily justify rejecting his claim, according to Justice
Souter. Relying on a view Justice Harlan outlined in his dissent in Miranda,
Justice Souter explained that expansions of the textual guarantee are warranted
“if clearly shown to be desirable means to protect the basic right against the
invasive pressures of contemporary society.”80 Such extensions of the core right,
according to Justice Souter, explained several of the Court’s Fifth Amendment
precedents, including rulings forbidding compulsion of witnesses in civil
proceedings, requiring grants of immunity in advance of compelled testimony
before grand juries, and preventing governmental threats or penalties that
undermine the right to immunity.81 This prophylactic understanding of the Fifth

74

Id.
Id. at 772-73 (explaining that “the absence of a ‘criminal case’ in which Martinez was
compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself defeats his core Fifth Amendment claim”). Justice
Thomas also opined on a question not presented to the Court: Officer Chavez’s failure to read
Miranda warnings to Martinez did not violate Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be
grounds for a § 1983 action. Id. at 772. That conclusion is based on the view that Miranda
warnings are not constitutional rights themselves, but merely prophylactic measures designed
to protect the Fifth Amendment. Id. (“We have likewise established the Miranda exclusionary
rule as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the text of the
Self-Incrimination Clause . . . .”).
76 Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter’s
opinion in its entirety.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
81 See id. at 777-78 (collecting cases).
75
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Amendment, according to Justice Souter, also explained Miranda.82 Put
differently, many of the Court’s Fifth Amendment rulings are “outside the Fifth
Amendment’s core, with each case expressing a judgment that the core
guarantee, or the judicial capacity to protect it,” would be undercut without such
“complementary protection.”83
According to Justice Souter, Martinez did not demonstrate the “powerful
showing” needed to justify expanding protection of the core Fifth Amendment
to include civil liability.84 The “most obvious drawback” to Martinez’s claim
was “its risk of global application” every time a police officer violates the rules
announced in Miranda and its progeny, or every time a government official
violates one of the rules announced by the Court’s other Fifth Amendment
precedents.85 Without explaining why, Justice Souter stated that recognizing
civil liability in such scenarios “would revolutionize” Fifth Amendment
doctrine, and begged the question why such an extension was necessary.86
Finally, Justice Souter had “no reason to believe” that current law had been
defective in protecting the core Fifth Amendment right.87
PART II
A. Should the Text of the Fifth Amendment Be Read Literally?
The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause was the ultimate basis for rejecting
Martinez’s claim that his Fifth Amendment right was violated when Officer
Chavez coerced him to make incriminating statements.88 Indeed, Justice Thomas

82

See id. at 778.
Id.
84 Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 515, 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
85 Id. Justice Souter’s concern was summarized as follows:
If obtaining Martinez’s statement is to be treated as a stand-alone violation of the
privilege subject to compensation, why should the same not be true whenever the police
obtain any involuntary self-incriminating statement, or whenever the government so
much threatens a penalty in derogation of the right to immunity, or whenever the police
fail to honor Miranda? Martinez offers no limiting principle or reason to foresee a
stopping place short of liability in all such cases.
Id. at 778-79 (footnote omitted). Justice Souter feared that awarding Martinez compensation
would mean that federal courts would have to also award compensation in all of the instances
he described. Justice Souter’s concern “seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.”
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 779 (“Martinez has offered no reason to believe that the guarantee
has been ineffective in all or many of those circumstances in which its vindication has
depended on excluding testimonial admissions or barring penalties.”).
87 Id.
88 The first sentence of Justice Thomas’s opinion appears to cast doubt about whether
Chavez compelled Martinez to incriminate himself: “This case involves a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
suit arising out of petitioner Ben Chavez’s allegedly coercive interrogation of respondent
Oliverio Martinez.” Id. at 763 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Despite Justice Thomas’s
83
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chided Justice Kennedy, who believed that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right
was violated,89 for “indifference to the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause, as
well as a conspicuous absence of a single citation to the actual text of the Fifth
Amendment.”90 But the notion that the text of the Fifth Amendment properly
and definitively resolves the issue raised in Chavez is facetious and ignores a
century of the Court’s Fifth Amendment rulings, which have rejected a literal
reading of the amendment when deciding the scope and meaning of the SelfIncrimination Clause. Equally troubling, a literal and wooden reading of the
Fifth Amendment privilege as a basis for the Court’s judgment makes no sense
because the text of the amendment is subject to differing interpretations—both
broad and narrow.
Acknowledging the ambiguous nature of the privilege is unremarkable. As
legal historian John Langbein has observed, the “history of the privilege against
self-incrimination at common law has long been murky.”91 Further, the Framing
generation was aware of the problem, as have been several generations of
lawyers and judges.92 Because Justice Thomas often professes to be concerned
suggestion that Martinez may not have been coerced, counsel for Chavez conceded during the
oral argument that Chavez used coercion to obtain incriminating statements. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14 (“I acknowledge that there is coercion in this case. We
don’t—we don’t blanch on that. There was coercion and the facts of this case are tragic, but
the—but the reality is this. This officer was there to find out a very important piece of
information under extraordinarily exigent circumstances.”).
89 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 789-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“A constitutional right is traduced the moment torture or its close equivalents are brought to
bear. Constitutional protection for a tortured suspect is not held in abeyance until some later
criminal proceeding takes place.”); id. at 791 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment “protects
an individual from being forced to give answers demanded by an official in any context when
the answers might give rise to criminal liability in the future”).
90 Id. at 773 n.4 (plurality opinion).
91 John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth
to the Eighteenth Centuries, in R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 82, 100 (1997).
92 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 4, at 422-27. As Levy explains, James Madison’s original
proposal for the Fifth Amendment right used phrasing that was “original,” and his placement
of the privilege in the Bill of Rights was “unusual.” Id. at 423. Madison’s language “revealed
an intent to incorporate into the Constitution the whole scope of the common-law right.” Id.
According to Levy:
Madison’s [original] proposal certainly applied to civil as well as criminal proceedings
and in principle to any stage of a legal inquiry, from the moment of arrest in a criminal
case, to the swearing of a deposition in a civil one. And not being restricted to judicial
proceedings, it extended to any other kind of governmental inquiry such as a legislative
investigation. . . . Madison, going beyond the recommendations of the states and the
constitution of his own state, phrased his own proposal to make it coextensive with the
broadest practice.
Id. at 423-24.
After Madison’s proposal was amended so that the right “be confined to criminal cases,”
id. at 424, if one interpreted the privilege literally, it “excluded from its protection parties and
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with the intention and thinking of the Framing era when deciding constitutional
cases,93 it is a bit ironic that his opinion in Chavez paid no attention to the
uncertain background surrounding the privilege and failed to cite any history of
the amendment to support his conclusion that no violation of the Fifth
Amendment occurs when police use coercion to obtain incriminating statements.
It is worth noting that Justice Thomas’s opinion departs from a line of common
law precedent predating the Bill of Rights. English and American courts in the
seventeenth century “protected” common law defendants from giving selfincriminating testimony by preventing them from giving any kind of testimony
sworn under oath.94 In contrast, witnesses for the prosecution and witnesses in
civil cases were given the opportunity to decline to answer incriminating
questions,95 and they invoked the privilege at high rates.96 In other words,
English courts in the era antedating the Bill of Rights recognized the privilege
of a witness not to answer incriminating questions. “But the evidentiary privilege
extended only to sworn witnesses. It didn’t extend to criminal defendants, who
weren’t sworn and who were expected (though never ‘compelled’) to talk.”97
This historical understanding of the privilege against self-incrimination
underscores the long-standing practice of extending the privilege in noncriminal

witnesses in civil and equity suits as well as witnesses before nonjudicial governmental
proceedings such as legislative investigations,” id. at 425.
93 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 56 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that he is not convinced that the Court’s prior precedents on the
constitutionality of roadblocks under the Fourth Amendment were correctly decided and
doubting that “the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered ‘reasonable’ a
program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing”); United States
v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that considerable
evidence suggests that the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment “protects against the
compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any incriminating evidence,”
and expressing a willingness to “reconsider the scope and meaning of the Self-Incrimination
Clause”); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents have “drifted far from the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause” and suggesting that the Court “ought to temper [its]
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of [its] more recent case
law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause”).
94 See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2659 (1996).
95 Id. (“Unlike defendants, prosecution witnesses and witnesses in civil cases were sworn,
and when they invoked the privilege, the courts forbade other trial participants from asking
them incriminating questions.”).
96 Id. at 2659 n.131 (“In the trial of Sir John Friend, 13 How. St. Tr. 1, 17 (1669), Lord
Chief Justice Treby said of a witness, ‘no man is bound to answer any questions that will
subject him to a penalty or to infamy.’”).
97 Email from Albert W. Alschuler, Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ. Pritzker Sch.
of Law, to Tracey Maclin, Professor of Law, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 5, 2017, 04:41
EST) (on file with author).
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settings that could lead to later criminal punishment.98 As a matter of history,
Justice Thomas’s opinion ignores that “the privilege not to give answers in noncriminal settings that could lead to criminal prosecution was the original
privilege against self-incrimination.”99
Although this is not the forum for a detailed review of the Fifth Amendment’s
origins and history,100 to fully understand the right not to be compelled to be a
witness against oneself, it is important to recall a few details about its history
and development. The First Congress, which proposed the Bill of Rights for
ratification to the states, positioned the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Fifth
Amendment, and not the Sixth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment contains an
amalgam of rights, including the right to have a grand jury’s presentment or
indictment before being charged with a “capital, or otherwise infamous crime,”
the right against double jeopardy, the right to due process before being deprived
of life, liberty or property, and the right not to have private property taken for
public use, without just compensation.101 The Sixth Amendment collected the
procedural rights of the criminally accused after indictment.102 By not placing
the privilege in the Sixth Amendment, Congress afforded a right that extended
to persons who had not been charged with a criminal offense. Put another way,
“the location of the self-incrimination clause in the Fifth Amendment rather than
the Sixth [Amendment] proves that the Senate, like the House, did not intend to
restrict that clause to the criminal defendant only nor only to his trial.”103 The
right embodied in the privilege, even considering that the text says “criminal
case,” stated a “principle broadly enough to apply to witnesses and to any phase
of the proceedings.”104
When Justice Thomas concluded that Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right was
not violated because his compelled statements were not used in a criminal
98

See Alschuler, supra note 94, at 2659.
Email from Albert W. Alschuler to Tracey Maclin, supra note 97.
100 Several scholars have provided comprehensive studies of the Fifth Amendment’s
history. See generally R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 91; LEVY, supra note 4; LEWIS
MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 9-19 (1959); 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 821-26b (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Alschuler, supra
note 94; E. M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949);
R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
101 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102 See id. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury of one’s peers, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted by all witnesses, to have a compulsory process for obtaining
one’s own witnesses, and to have the assistance of counsel for one’s defense. Id.
103 LEVY, supra note 4, at 427.
104 Id. Without disputing this history, another scholar of the Fifth Amendment’s origins
notes that “the legislative history of the Fifth Amendment adds little to our understanding of
the history of the privilege.” Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1123 (1994).
99
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prosecution, he was not enforcing the provision as written. Instead, Justice
Thomas put his own gloss on the text.105 In commenting on the literal words of
the privilege, Justice Brennan once observed:
The words of the Fifth Amendment do not, in terms, suggest that
government may compel men to incriminate themselves provided it
promises that it will not prosecute them for the crimes revealed. The clause
does not prohibit a prosecution or conviction; it prohibits the application
vel non of compulsion to an individual to force testimony that incriminates
him, regardless of whether he is actually prosecuted.106
Put differently, despite his professed fealty to the text of the Fifth
Amendment, Justice Thomas did exactly what Justice Douglass criticized the
majority for in Ullmann v. United States,107 nearly fifty years earlier:
The guarantee is that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.” The majority does not enforce that guarantee
as written but qualifies it; and the qualification apparently reads, “but only
if criminal conviction might result.” Wisely or not, the Fifth Amendment
protects against the compulsory self-accusation of crime without exception
or qualification.108
Moreover, although none of the Justices who rejected Martinez’s Fifth
Amendment claim are willing to admit it, the text of the privilege is not as clear
they contend. The right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment extends beyond
“self-incrimination,” a term not found in the text. As Levy explains:
The “right against self-incrimination” is a short-hand gloss of modern
origin that implies a restriction not in the constitutional clause. The right
not to be a witness against oneself imports a principle of wider reach,
applicable, at least in criminal cases, to the self-production of any adverse
evidence, including evidence that made one the herald of his own infamy,
thereby publicly disgracing him. The clause extended, in other words, to
all the injurious as well as incriminating consequences of disclosure by
witness or party.109
Put simply, to interpret the privilege as confined to a right against selfincrimination “stunts the wider right . . . not to be a witness against oneself.”110
Ultimately, Justice Thomas neglects a crucial point: the literal terms of the Fifth
Amendment privilege do not convey a single meaning. The Justices recognized

105
106
107
108
109
110

In fairness to Justice Thomas, he is not the first jurist to do this.
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 564 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
350 U.S. 422 (1956).
Id. at 443 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
LEVY, supra note 4, at 427.
Id.
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this fact long ago. In 1896, the Court stated that the right embodied in the Fifth
Amendment “is obviously susceptible of two interpretations.”111
On the one hand, if she were so inclined, a judge could literally read the text
of the Fifth Amendment to protect a person against any harmful disclosure,
including civil liability, regardless of whether that person was charged with a
crime. Such a broad reading of the clause is not forbidden by the text, and many
judges, from the Framing era to more modern times, have expressly adopted this
broad reading of the privilege.112 In Brown v. Walker, a majority of the Court
acknowledged that the amendment could be construed literally “as authorizing
the witness to refuse to disclose any fact which might tend to incriminate,
disgrace or expose him to unfavorable comments.”113 The dissenters went even
further. Three of the dissenting Justices in Brown read the privilege to guarantee
an absolute right to silence, which Congress could not divest even with a grant
of immunity,114 while the fourth dissenter read the amendment to protect a
person “from all compulsory testimony which would expose him to infamy and
disgrace, though the facts disclosed might not lead to a criminal prosecution.”115
111

Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595 (1896).
See, e.g., Ullman, 350 U.S. at 450-53 (“The Fifth Amendment was designed to protect
the accused against infamy as well as against prosecution.”); id. at 454 (“When public opinion
casts a person into the outer darkness, as happens today when a person is exposed as a
Communist, the government brings infamy on the head of the witness when it compels
disclosure. That is precisely what the Fifth Amendment prohibits.”); Brown, 161 U.S. at 630
(Field, J., dissenting) (“The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States gives
absolute protection to a person called as a witness in a criminal case against the compulsory
enforcement of any criminating testimony against himself. . . . No substitute for the protection
contemplated by the amendment would be sufficient were its operation less extensive and
efficient.”); id. at 631 (“All [phrases or words of any provision of the amendment] are to be
construed liberally that they may have the widest and most ample effect.”); United States v.
James, 60 F. 257, 265 (N.D. Ill. 1894) (“[T]he privilege of silence, against a criminal
accusation, guarantied[sic] by the fifth amendment, was meant to extend to all the
consequences of disclosure.”). Additionally, as Levy notes:
After the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, the earliest state and federal cases were in
accord with [the view that the right not to be a witness against oneself included protection
against any injurious disclosures], which suggests that whatever the wording of the
constitutional formulation, it did not supersede or even limit the common-law
right. . . . The state courts of the framers’ generation followed the extension of the right
to cover self-infamy as well as self-incrimination, although the self-infamy rule
eventually fell into disuse.
LEVY, supra note 4, at 427-29 (footnote omitted).
113 Brown, 161 U.S. at 595.
114 See id. at 610 (Shiras, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Fifth Amendment means “not
merely that every person should have such immunity [from compelled testimony], but that his
right thereto should not be divested or impaired by any act of Congress”).
115 Id. at 631 (Field, J., dissenting). In the end, the Brown majority chose to interpret the
amendment “to effect a practical and beneficent purpose.” Id. at 596 (majority opinion).
According to the majority, the Fifth Amendment does not “protect witnesses against every
possible detriment which might happen to them from their testimony, nor to unduly impede,
112
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On the other hand, if a judge were so inclined, she could read the text to mean
that a violation of the Fifth Amendment only occurs when the Government
compels a person to testify against himself in a criminal trial.116 As then-Justice
Rehnquist noted, “the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast
might be construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to
call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial.”117 Moreover, a
judge could go further by literally reading the text to permit the prosecution to
introduce “evidence obtained prior to trial by police or judicial coercion”
because “[t]he words of the Fifth Amendment say nothing about evidence.”118
Indeed, a strict (and plausible) reading of the text of the Fifth Amendment:
[P]rohibits the government only from compelling a person to testify—that’s
what “a witness” does—“against himself” in “any criminal case.” Its words
do not prohibit the police from testifying about—or playing a recording
of—what the defendant said when he was merely a suspect and not yet a
witness, after the police compelled him to speak but before the criminal
trial began. Nor does it prohibit a clerk from reading the transcript of
testimony the person was compelled by a judge to give in a noncriminal
case. So long as the defendant himself is not called as an actual witness by
the prosecution and compelled to give live testimony against himself at the
criminal trial itself, the text of the Constitution—literally read, as Justice
Thomas said it should be—is not violated.119
Although this literal interpretation of the text might be shocking to persons
raised during an era when police on television shows and in the movies inform
suspects of their “right to silence,” it is a plausible view of the Fifth
Amendment’s bare terms.
In light of these alternative readings of the privilege, it is not obvious why
Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the text is the only permissible reading of the
privilege. Certainly, Justice Thomas, who fails to cite any history of the Fifth
Amendment, makes no effort to explain why his literal reading is the only, let
alone best, interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. What Justice Thomas ignores
in Chavez is that the Court disavowed a literal interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment at the end of the nineteenth century. Just as the Government did in
Chavez in 2003, the federal government in 1892 urged the Court in Counselman
v. Hitchcock120 to construe the Fifth Amendment literally. The Court demurred:
hinder or obstruct the administration of criminal justice.” Id.
116 In 1936, dicta from the Court’s decision in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
observed that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is restricted to “the
processes of justice by which the accused may be called as a witness and required to testify,”
id. at 285.
117 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974).
118 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 29. As Alan Dershowitz rightly notes, such a result was
“categorically rejected by the entire court in [Chavez].” Id.
119 Id. at 29-30.
120 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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“It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can only be,
that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal
prosecution against himself.”121 Certainly, the amendment covers cases where
the Government compels a defendant to testify at his own prosecution; “but it is
not limited to them.”122 The object of the privilege was to guarantee that a
“person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation,
to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a
crime.”123 The Counselman Court explained that the text of the Fifth
Amendment limits the privilege “to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard.”124 Since 1892, in case after case, the
Court has turned away efforts to read the privilege in a literal manner.125 The
problems associated with a literal reading of the Fifth Amendment, coupled with
the Court’s consistent disapproval of such an approach, prompted Erwin
Griswold, “the conservative Dean of . . . Harvard Law School,”126 in 1962 to
provide this answer to the question of whether the Fifth Amendment should be
read literally: “This is a question which was raised and answered long ago, so
long ago in fact that lawyers tend to take it for granted. But early courts saw that
the protection of the amendment itself would be an empty gesture if it was
literally applied.”127 Incredibly, Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez ignores all
of this.
In light of the above discussion, it is understandable why Justice Kennedy
eschewed a literal interpretation of the Constitution in deciding whether Officer
Chavez violated the Fifth Amendment when he employed coercion to obtain an
incriminating statement from Martinez. According to Justice Kennedy, the
Court’s precedents and the nation’s “legal tradition establish that the SelfIncrimination Clause is a substantive constraint on the conduct of the
Government, not merely an evidentiary rule governing the work of the
121

Id. at 562. In Counselman, the Government argued that a grand jury proceeding is not
a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court rejected that
view. See id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (“[T]he history of the
privilege establishes . . . that it is not to be interpreted literally.”); Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155, 161-65 (1955) (discussing the application of the Fifth Amendment to the case before
the Court, but not pausing to consider whether a hearing conducted by a subcommittee of the
House of Representatives was in fact a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) (explaining in a case where
a witness was subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee, that “no ritualistic
formula or talismanic phrase is essential in order to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination”); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (rejecting the government’s
argument that the Fifth Amendment “does not apply in any civil proceeding”).
126 LEVY, supra note 4, at viii.
127 GRISWOLD, supra note 5, at 54-55.

2017]

THE PROPHYLACTIC FIFTH AMENDMENT

1067

courts.”128 It requires a considerable degree of judicial arrogance to insist that
the Fifth Amendment must be read literally.129 The Court’s Self-Incrimination
Clause jurisprudence, which is more than a century old, says the exact opposite.
But Justice Thomas must believe he knows better.
B. The Court’s Precedents
Justice Thomas in Chavez also insisted that his literal interpretation of the
privilege and resultant conclusion that Martinez did not suffer a Fifth
Amendment violation were mandated by the Court’s precedents. According to
Justice Thomas, prior rulings established that “mere coercion does not violate
the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements
in a criminal case against the witness.”130 Like his analysis of the Fifth
Amendment’s text, Justice Thomas’s discussion of the Court’s precedents is
one-sided and omits consideration of cases where the Court found Fifth
Amendment violations because government officials employed coercion to
obtain incriminating admissions.
To be sure, in one of the so-called “penalty cases,”131 Garrity v. New Jersey,132
the Court held that the Fifth Amendment bars “use in subsequent criminal
proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office.”133 But
128

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 791 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
129 Justice Kennedy’s reaction to Justice Thomas’s and Justice Souter’s reading of the Fifth
Amendment is worth quoting in-full:
The conclusion that the Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated until the government
seeks to use a statement in some later criminal proceeding strips the Clause of an
essential part of its force and meaning. This is no small matter. It should come as an
unwelcome surprise to judges, attorneys, and the citizenry as a whole that if a legislative
committee or a judge in a civil case demands incriminating testimony without offering
immunity, and even imposes sanctions for failure to comply, that the witness and counsel
cannot insist the right against compelled self-incrimination is applicable then and there.
Justice Souter and Justice Thomas, I submit, should be more respectful of the
understanding that has prevailed for generations now. To tell our whole legal system that
when conducting a criminal investigation police officials can use severe compulsion or
even torture with no present violation of the right against compelled self-incrimination
can only diminish a celebrated provision in the Bill of Rights. A Constitution survives
over time because the people share a common, historic commitment to certain simple
but fundamental principles which preserve their freedom. Today’s decision undermines
one of those respected precepts.
Id. at 793-94.
130 Id. at 769 (plurality opinion).
131 The “penalty cases” refer to a series of cases where “the state not only compelled an
individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forego the Fifth Amendment
privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the selfincrimination which the Amendment forbids.’” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434
(1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977)).
132 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
133 Id. at 500 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Garrity Court did not—as Justice
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Garrity was just one of several cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s
application to government efforts to induce incriminating statements. Other
rulings, announced before and after Garrity, involve cases where the Court
found Fifth Amendment violations when government officials utilize
compulsion to induce a statement, “even where there was no possibility that a
statement would be used in a criminal trial, and even where no statement was
generated.”134
As already discussed, Counselman rejected the government’s efforts to
impose a narrow interpretation to the amendment’s phrase “in any criminal case”
and held that the privilege is applicable in a grand jury proceeding.135 A literal
reading of the amendment’s text in Counselman “would have drained the
privilege of most of its vitality.”136 After Counselman, it was still available for
the Government to contend that the amendment’s text—“in any criminal case”—
meant that the privilege was unavailable when the compelled testimony was
sought in a civil case. McCarthy v. Arndstein137 eliminated that argument.
After being adjudged an involuntary bankrupt, Arndstein was subpoenaed to
testify before a special commissioner to examine and distribute his assets
pursuant to federal bankruptcy law.138 At a civil bankruptcy hearing, Arndstein
invoked the privilege to certain questions.139 Arndstein made no incriminating
statements and was not prosecuted for a criminal offense; he was, however,
judged in contempt.140 Arndstein subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus
seeking his release.141 The federal government argued before the Court, in light
of the Fifth Amendment’s text, that the privilege does not apply in a civil
proceeding; the Court, however, disagreed.142
Thomas did in Chavez—adopt a literal interpretation of the privilege. See id. at 496-500
(discussing the Court’s prior decisions of applying the privilege outside of a strict
interpretation of “criminal case”). For a comprehensive review of Garrity and its impact on
the prosecution of police officers, see generally Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements
from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2001).
134 Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2003); see also id.
at 1341-43 (collecting cases).
135 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892); supra notes 120-24 and
accompanying text.
136 Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, The Privilege Against Compelled SelfIncrimination, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 249, 280 (1990). As Charles Moylan and John
Sonsteng explain, Counselman “reasoned that the privilege was available in any forum, civil
or criminal, legislative or judicial, investigative or adjudicative, so long as the testimony there
compelled might later be used against the witness ‘in any criminal case.’” Id.
137 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
138 Id. at 38.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 40 (“The government insists, broadly, that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as
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The Court explained that the privilege “is not ordinarily dependent upon the
nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It
applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend
to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.”143 If the protections of
the privilege are operative in a grand jury proceeding and a civil bankruptcy
hearing, neither of which is a “criminal case,” logic suggests that the
amendment’s protections are operative during police interrogation, especially
when the target of the interrogation “reasonably believes [that his disclosures]
could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might
be so used.”144 This is exactly the situation Martinez faced.
In Spevack v. Klein,145 a companion case to Garrity, a lawyer faced a
disciplinary proceeding for professional misconduct.146 The lawyer refused to
testify and would not produce any of his records, invoking the Fifth
Amendment.147 Although the lawyer did not incriminate himself and faced no
subsequent criminal prosecution, he was ordered disbarred by the New York
courts.148 The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the State employed
impermissible compulsion and thus violated the lawyer’s Fifth Amendment
right.149 In light of Garrity’s ruling excluding compelled statements and their
fruits from a subsequent criminal prosecution,150 Spevack’s holding seems
“justifiable only on the ground that it is an essential measure to protect against
self-incrimination—to prevent what may well be a successful attempt to elicit
incriminating admissions.”151 Tellingly, none of the dissenters in Spevack relied
on the Fifth Amendment’s text in rejecting Spevack’s claim. Even Justice
Harlan, “the great dissenter” on the Warren Court,152 acknowledged that the
settled.”).
143 Id.
144 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972).
145 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
146 Id. at 512.
147 Id. at 512-13.
148 Id. at 513. Relying on Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), which held that the
privilege was not applicable in state disbarment proceedings, see id. at 125-29, the New York
courts ruled that the privilege was unavailable to Spevack in legal disciplinary proceedings,
see In re Spevack, 213 N.E.2d 457, 457-58 (N.Y.), aff’g 24 A.D.2d 653 (N.Y. App. Div.
1965).
149 Spevack, 385 U.S. at 516 (“The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional
standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make
a lawyer relinquish the privilege. That threat is indeed as powerful an instrument of
compulsion as ‘the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the
evidence necessary to convict him . . . .’” (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698
(1944)).
150 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); supra notes 132-34 and
accompanying text.
151 Spevack, 385 U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
152 See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER
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“Constitution contains no formulae with which we can calculate the areas
within . . . which the privilege should extend, and the Court has therefore been
obliged to fashion for itself standards for the application of the privilege.”153
Likewise, in Gardner v. Broderick154 and Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v.
Commissioner of Sanitation,155 a New York City police officer and New York
City sanitation employees, respectively, filed civil actions claiming that they had
been unlawfully dismissed from their jobs because they refused to waive their
Fifth Amendment privilege when subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury
investigating criminal activity.156 Again, in both cases, no incriminating
statements were obtained from the city workers and no criminal charges were
filed.157 None of the city workers were offered immunity for their testimony.158
Nonetheless, the Court, speaking through Justice Fortas in both cases, concluded
that the workers could not be dismissed from their jobs for invoking and thereby
refusing to waive their Fifth Amendment rights.159 What Justice Fortas wrote in
Gardner seems equally applicable to Chavez: “[T]he mandate of the great
privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of
its ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on
penalty of the loss of employment.”160 If the privilege prevents government
officials from attempting to coerce a waiver from city employees, “regardless of
its ultimate effectiveness,” a fortiori, it should prevent Officer Chavez from
attempting to coerce an incriminating statement from Martinez.
Five years after Gardner and Uniformed Sanitation Men, the Court decided
Lefkowitz v. Turley.161 Two architects licensed by the State of New York “were

WARREN COURT (1992) (chronicling Justice Harlan’s jurisprudence, and describing
him throughout his time on the Court as a “great dissenter”).
153 Spevack, 385 U.S. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
154 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
155 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
156 See Uniformed Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 281-83; Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274-75.
157 See Uniformed Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 282; Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274-75.
158 See Uniformed Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 282; Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274-75.
159 See Uniformed Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 283 (“[The workers] were dismissed for
invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional right against self-incrimination. They were
discharged for refusal to expose themselves to criminal prosecution based on testimony which
they would give under compulsion, despite their constitutional privilege.”); Gardner, 392
U.S. at 278 (“[Gardner] was discharged from office, not for failure to answer relevant
questions about his official duties, but for refusal to waive a constitutional right. He was
dismissed for failure to relinquish the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination.”).
The Court in Gardner distinguished its facts from Garrity, explaining that Garrity did not
address the discrete question presented in Gardner, namely “whether a State may discharge
an officer for refusing to waive a right which the Constitution guarantees to him.” Gardner,
392 U.S. at 277.
160 Gardner, 392 U.S. at 277.
161 414 U.S 70 (1973).
OF THE
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summoned to testify before a grand jury investigating [criminal conduct].”162 At
the grand jury, “[t]hey were asked, but refused, to sign waivers of immunity, the
effect of which would have been to waive their right not to be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against themselves.”163 As a result of their refusal
to sign the waiver, any existing contracts the architects had with the State were
cancelled, and they were disqualified from further transactions with the State for
five years.164 As in Ardnstein, Spevack, Gardner, and Uniformed Sanitation
Men, the architects made no incriminating statements and no criminal charges
were filed against them.165 The architects filed a civil claim alleging that the
State’s action cancelling their existing and future contracting rights violated the
Fifth Amendment.166 The Court upheld their claim.167
Although Justice White perceived “little legal or practical basis” for
upholding a Fifth Amendment claim in Spevack where a lawyer “incriminated
himself in no way whatsoever” during a disciplinary proceeding and did not face
criminal charges,168 in Turley he saw things differently. Justice White’s majority
opinion explained that the goal of the Fifth Amendment “‘was to insure that a
person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation,
to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a
crime.’”169 This principle, according to Justice White, “reflected the settled
view” of the Court.170 Thus, there was “no room for urging that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is inapplicable simply because the issue arises . . . in the
context of official inquiries into the job performance of a public contractor.”171
Nor was the State’s interest in maintaining the integrity of its civil service and
contracting business enough to override the Fifth Amendment rights of the
architects.172 Furthermore, even though the architects had made no incriminating
statements and faced no criminal charges, Justice White explained that the
rulings in Garrity, Gardner, and Uniformed Sanitation Men controlled.173 When
the State asked questions that were potentially incriminating, required the waiver
of the architects’ Fifth Amendment protection, and disqualified the architects as

162

Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
164 Id. at 71-72.
165 Id. at 76.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 531 (1967) (White, J., dissenting).
169 Turley, 414 U.S. at 77 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)).
170 Id. (citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)).
171 Id. at 78.
172 See id. at 78-79 (noting that “claims of overriding interests are not unusual in Fifth
Amendment litigation and they have not fared well” (citing Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n
v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968);
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)).
173 See id. at 82.
163
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public contractors for refusal to sign a waiver, New York officials sought to
obtain “what Garrity specifically prohibited⎯to compel testimony that had not
been immunized.”174
Finally, Justice White saw no merit in the State’s argument that the architects
had experienced no compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment nor
suffered a forbidden penalty by being disqualified as public contractors for
refusing to answer the grand jury’s questions.175 Leaving no doubt about when
the constitutional violation occurred, Justice White expressly agreed with the
lower court’s conclusion that “the [architects’] disqualification from public
contracting for five years as a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege is
violative of their Fifth Amendment rights.”176 This last point made clear that the
architects’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated upon imposition of the
disqualification from public contracting. Their constitutional rights were not
held in abeyance until some future time when a compelled statement might be
introduced or used in a criminal case. Just as the architects possessed a present
right not to be compelled, Martinez possessed the same right while being
interrogated.177
Lastly, there is Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,178 which addressed whether a
political party official could be removed from his position by the State and
barred for five years from holding any other party or public office because he
refused to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege when testifying before a grand
jury.179 Patrick Cunningham refused to waive the privilege when subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury that was investigating his conduct in the political
positions he occupied.180 As in the cases described above, Cunningham made no
incriminating statements to the grand jury and later faced no criminal charges.181
As a result of his refusal to waive the privilege, a New York statute mandated
Cunningham’s immediate removal from his political party offices.182
Cunningham then filed a civil action and sought injunctive relief against

174

Id.
See id. at 83.
176 Id. at 83 (emphasis added) (quoting Turley v. Lefkowitz, 342 F. Supp. 544, 549
(W.D.N.Y. 1972)).
177 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 791 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Clause provides both assurance that a person will not be compelled
to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding and a continuing right against government
conduct intended to bring about self-incrimination.” (citing Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973))).
178 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
179 See id. at 802-03.
180 Id. at 803.
181 Id.
182 See id. at 803-04.
175
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enforcement of the statute on the ground that the law violated his Fifth
Amendment right.183 The Court upheld his claim.184
Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in Cunningham relied upon Garrity,
Gardner, Uniformed Sanitation Men, and Turley for the established principle
that Government “cannot penalize assertion of the constitutional privilege
against compelled self-incrimination by imposing sanctions to compel testimony
which has not been immunized.”185 The Chief Justice explained that “the
touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion, and direct economic
sanctions and imprisonment are not the only penalties capable of forcing the
self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.”186 Chief Justice Burger
stated that the New York law threatened Cunningham with grave consequences,
including the loss of positions that carry substantial prestige and political
influence, solely because he would not relinquish his Fifth Amendment right.187
Thus, the law was “constitutionally indistinguishable from the coercive
provisions” invalidated in Gardner, Uniformed Sanitation Men, and Turley.188
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez proceeds as if these cases are irrelevant
to the question before the Court.189 For example, Justice Thomas read the text of
the Fifth Amendment, specifically, the term “criminal case,” to require the
“initiation of legal proceedings,”190 and explained that police interrogation does

183

Id. at 804.
Id.
185 Id. at 806.
186 Id.
187 See id. at 807.
188 Id.
189 Although by no means on all fours with Chavez, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Chavez
convinces me that McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002), also undermines Justice Thomas’s
vision of what the Fifth Amendment protects. A Kansas prison rehabilitation program
required convicted sex offenders to acknowledge their past crimes in order to be eligible to
participate in the program and enjoy some of the program’s benefits not accorded to other
prisoners. Id. at 30 (plurality opinion). Robert Lile contended that requiring him to admit his
past crime violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 31. A plurality of the Justices found that
because the program promotes an important penological goal and offers minimal incentives
to prisoners to participate, it does not violate the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 47-48. While
Lile lost his claim, according to his separate opinion in Chavez, Justice Kennedy noted that
all nine Justices in Lile “proceeded from the premise that a present, completed violation of
the Self-Incrimination Clause could occur if an incarcerated prisoner were required to admit
to past crimes on pain of forfeiting certain privileges or being assigned harsher conditions of
confinement.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 793 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (plurality opinion); id. at 48 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In other words, “[n]o Member
of the [Lile] Court suggested that the absence of a pending criminal proceeding made the SelfIncrimination Clause inquiry irrelevant.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
190 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766 (plurality opinion).
184
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not constitute a “case” under the Fifth Amendment.191 If police questioning is
not a “case,” it is not obvious why a grand jury proceeding is one. But after
Counselman rejected the Government’s argument that a grand jury hearing is
not a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,192 why does
it matter that Justice Thomas believes that police questioning is not a “criminal
case”? Moreover, why does it matter after Miranda explicitly put to rest the
notion that the privilege does not apply in the police station or to police
interrogation generally? As Chief Justice Warren observed:
The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable
during a period of custodial interrogation. In this Court, the privilege has
consistently been accorded a liberal construction. We are satisfied that all
the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion
exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of
persuasion [exerted by police] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion
to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated
setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other
official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard
against intimidation or trickery.193
Put another way, if Miranda left no doubt that the privilege “fully” applies
during police interrogation, why does it matter, when interpreting the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment, “that police questioning does not constitute a ‘case’
any more than a private investigator’s precomplaint activities constitute a ‘civil
case’”?194 Indeed, over fifty years ago, the federal government told the Court:
It has long been recognized . . . that the policies underlying the privilege
may be violated by informal compulsion exerted by a law-enforcement
officer acting under color of authority. We have no doubt therefore, that it
is possible for a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right to be violated during incustody questioning by a law-enforcement officer.195
191 See id. at 767. Justice Souter’s separate opinion in Chavez did not address or attempt to
define when a “criminal case” begins for determining when a compelled statement is used
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
192 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892); supra notes 120-24 and
accompanying text.
193 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966) (citations omitted).
194 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767 (plurality opinion).
195 Brief of Respondent at 28, Westover v. United States, No. 761, consolidated, Miranda
v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Brief of Respondent at 40-41 n.44, Anderson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943) (No. 10-513) (“Logically and practically there is no real
difference between torture in the courtroom to compel a witness to testify and torture outside
to obtain a confession to read at the trial. The scope of the privilege is not to be limited by
technical notions of the scope of a ‘criminal case’ but ‘is as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard.’” (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)
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In any event, the above cases⎯Garrity, Spevack, Gardner, Uniformed
Sanitation Men, Turley, and Cunningham⎯clearly show that the Warren and
Burger Courts believed that the “initiation of legal proceedings” was not
required to trigger Fifth Amendment protection. Not only were there no
“criminal cases” in Spevack, Gardner, Uniformed Sanitation Men, Turley, and
Cunningham, there were no incriminating statements that could be used in a
criminal prosecution, if such a prosecution had been initiated. Nonetheless, the
Court in each of these cases concluded that the Fifth Amendment was violated.
In addition, these cases also show what Justice Thomas insisted the text of the
amendment does not authorize, namely, government compulsion to induce
incriminating admissions violates the Fifth Amendment. To reiterate, these
rulings demonstrate that even when no incriminating statements were obtained
and no subsequent criminal charges were filed, the Fifth Amendment “does not
tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness,” to coerce selfincrimination.196
Justice Thomas’s opinion never discusses the holdings of these cases. Only in
a footnote does he get close to acknowledging part of the holdings of Uniformed
Sanitation Men and Turley when he writes that the Government may not
“penalize public employees and government contractors to induce them to waive
their immunity from the use of their compelled statements in subsequent criminal
proceedings.”197 But he couples that description with the assertion that
“immunity is not itself a right secured by the text of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, but rather a prophylactic rule we have constructed to protect the Fifth
Amendment’s right from invasion.”198
Justice Thomas’s statement that immunity is not a textual right is true, but
utterly unhelpful. Whatever one thinks of the use of prophylactic rules in
constitutional decision-making,199 my reading of Garrity, Spevack, Gardner,

(citations omitted))).
196 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968); cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,
531 (1967) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s ruling is based on the premise that
“it is an essential measure to protect against self-incrimination⎯to prevent what may well be
a successful attempt to elicit incriminating admissions”).
197 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968);
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973)).
198 Id.
199 Compare JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173-98 (1993)
(recognizing that the text of the Constitution cannot address all issues that will arise in
constitutional litigation, but arguing that the prophylactic rules announced in Miranda were
illegitimate), and Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 105-06, 123-47 (1985) (questioning the
legitimacy of prophylactic rules generally, and arguing that Miranda’s prophylactic were
plainly illegitimate), with David A. Strauss, Miranda, The Constitution, and Congress, 99
MICH. L. REV. 958, 960 (2001) (contending that “constitutional rules⎯routinely,
unavoidably, and quite properly⎯treat ‘the Constitution itself’ as requiring ‘prophylaxis’”),
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Uniformed Sanitation Men, Turley, and Cunningham convinces me that the
Court believed it was applying the real Fifth Amendment. There is no indication
in any of these cases that the Court thought it was enforcing some judge-made
or “prophylactic” rule. Thus, Justice Thomas proffers revisionist analysis when
he suggests that these cases do not enforce “a constitutional right.”200 As the
above discussion demonstrates, the Court was enforcing the Fifth Amendment
in each of these cases.
And as far as immunity is concerned, what is the point of asserting that
immunity is not mentioned in the text of the amendment, but instead is a judgemade rule? This is true, but why does it matter in Chavez where the target of the
Government’s compulsion was never given immunity for his compelled
statements? More pertinent, because he believes that immunity is not a
constitutional right, Justice Thomas contended that Martinez’s ignorance that
his compelled statements could not be used at a criminal trial was
constitutionally irrelevant. Justice Thomas’s view of the constitutional
significance of immunity is dead wrong. In each of the cases discussed above,
the witness does not have immunity, and thus, her Fifth Amendment rights are
violated because she cannot be compelled to answer without this safeguard
against later use. In Gardner and Uniformed Sanitation Men, for example, the
police officer’s and sanitation employees’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated
because they were dismissed from their jobs after refusing to waive their Fifth
Amendment right without the protection of immunity. In contrast, the Court
found in Brown that compelling a witness to speak with the grant of immunity
would not violate the Fifth Amendment.201 Time and again, the Court has
recognized that without immunity to assure a witness that her statement cannot
be used against her in a criminal case, she cannot be compelled to answer without
violating her Fifth Amendment rights.
This was precisely the situation Martinez faced. As he lay in a hospital
receiving treatment for gunshot wounds related to the recent officer-involved
shooting, Martinez was interrogated by Officer Chavez without receiving
Miranda warnings. Despite clearly and repeatedly telling Officer Chavez that he
did not want to answer any questions about the shooting, Officer Chavez
continued to question Martinez. Eventually, Martinez made incriminating
statements. Martinez was not granted immunity. It follows, bearing in mind
and David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190-95,
207-09 (1988) (arguing that prophylactic rules announced by the Court are not only
legitimate, but are a “central and necessary” component of constitutional decision-making).
200 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772 (plurality opinion) (“Rules designed to safeguard a
constitutional right, however, do not extend the scope of the constitutional right itself, just as
violations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the constitutional rights of
any person. As we explained, we have allowed the Fifth Amendment privilege to be asserted
by witnesses in noncriminal cases in order to safeguard the core constitutional right defined
by the Self-Incrimination Clause⎯the right not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against oneself.”).
201 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
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Arndstein, Spevack, and the entire line of cases Justice Thomas overlooks, that
Martinez could not be compelled to speak without this assurance of immunity.
To paraphrase Justice White’s opinion in Turley, Officer Chavez sought to
obtain what the Court’s precedents barred—“to compel testimony that had not
been immunized.”202 It does not matter where the witness is when she is
compelled to speak, be it a grand jury proceeding, bankruptcy hearing, hospital,
or police interrogation room. Unless the witness knows that the compelled
statement cannot be used against him—unless he has been granted immunity—
he cannot be compelled to answer. Put differently, if the witness does not know
that his statements cannot be used against him later in a criminal case, his Fifth
Amendment right is presently violated. Each of these cases demonstrate this
proposition and Justice Thomas declined to see this as a compelling,
distinguishing factor.203 Justice Thomas’s opinion departs from this very long
and consistent line of precedents.
A century of Fifth Amendment doctrine establishes that the privilege and
immunity (either judicial or legislative) work together to produce the same
result. As noted many years ago, “[i]t is accepted that the privilege against selfincrimination includes some degree of immunity from use of testimony procured
in violation of the privilege.”204 Justice Black put it nicely when he noted “a
witness does not need any [immunity] statute to protect him from the use of selfincriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth
Amendment takes care of that without a statute.”205 Perhaps, that is why the
Court has recognized that immunity statutes “have ‘become part of our
constitutional fabric.’”206 Because the Fifth Amendment itself demands some
form of immunity, either by statute or court action in the form of a suppression
order or reversal of a conviction obtained with the use of compelled testimony,
Justice Thomas’s description of immunity is not only incorrect, it is unhelpful
and adds nothing to the constitutional analysis in Chavez.207
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Turley, 414 U.S. at 82.
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
204 McKay, supra note 7, at 231.
205 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954).
206 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 447 (1972) (quoting Ullmann v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)).
207 Dershowitz writes that “Justice Thomas’s narrow reading of the text of the privilege
seems to support the conclusion that immunity is not constitutionally required before a witness
can be compelled to answer self-incriminating questions.” DERSHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 47
(emphasis added). Dershowitz explains why:
In a civil case or a legislative hearing, there is no textual prohibition against compelling
testimony. And since compelled or coerced testimony, according to Thomas, will be
“automatically” excluded from “any criminal case” in which the person is a defendant,
it would seem to follow that a formal grant of immunity should no longer be required as
a prerequisite for imprisoning a witness who refuses to answer self-incriminating
questions.
Id. at 47-48. Carolyn Frantz appears to share Dershowitz’s view that, after Chavez, immunity
203
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PART III
Despite the disputed and elusive nature of the history of the Fifth Amendment,
little controversy is raised by claiming that at the time of the Framing, the Fifth
Amendment was intended “to prohibit improper methods of interrogation.”208
may no longer be a prerequisite in order to compel incriminating statements in noncriminal
proceedings. According to Frantz, Chavez’s understanding of the Fifth Amendment:
ought to change practice in at least one very significant respect: the Court ought to allow
testimony to be compelled in noncriminal proceedings, and wait to use the suppression
remedy to address whatever problems arise in the criminal trial. This change of practice
would alter the privilege’s role in a variety of contexts. Essentially, government actors
could compel individuals to make incriminating statements, so long as they were willing
to risk having to forgo use of that evidence and its fruits in a subsequent criminal trial.
Of course, they may do this now, but only if they explicitly grant up-front immunity. The
new understanding of the privilege would seem to remove that requirement.
Carolyn J. Frantz, Chavez v. Martinez’s Constitutional Division of Labor, 2003 SUP. CT. REV.
269, 288.
Although I agree with Dershowitz’s criticism of Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment, I doubt that the Court is ready to adopt the view that a formal grant of immunity
is no longer required before imprisoning a witness who refuses to provide self-incriminating
admissions. The Court has made it clear that while the government can compel selfincriminatory statements, it must provide immunity commensurate with the privilege to
satisfy the Constitution. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S 70, 85 (1973) (“[I]f answers are to
be required [by a state contractor subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury] States must offer
to the witness whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege and may not insist that
the employee or contractor waive such immunity.”); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461 (“The privilege
assures that a citizen is not compelled to incriminate himself by his own testimony. It usually
operates to allow a citizen to remain silent when asked a question requiring an incriminatory
answer. This [federal immunity] statute, which operates after a witness has given
incriminatory testimony, affords the same protection by assuring that the compelled testimony
can in no way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties.”); Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 439 (1956) (“Immunity displaces the danger. Once the reason for the privilege
ceases, the privilege ceases.”); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896) (“While the [Fifth
Amendment] is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its
object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity, and we are, therefore, of opinion that
the witness was compellable to answer . . . .”). Imprisoning a person for refusing to testify
without an immunity grant would violate the Fifth Amendment because imprisonment would
be a penalty equal to, if not greater than, the penalties suffered by Spevack, Gardner, the
sanitation workers, Turley, and Cunningham.
208 Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in HELMHOLZ ET
AL., supra note 91, at 181, 185. In an influential article, Alschuler summarizes what the Fifth
Amendment protected during the Framing era:
The Fifth Amendment privilege prohibited (1) incriminating interrogation under oath,
(2) torture, and (3) probably other forms of coercive interrogation such as threats of
future punishment and promises of leniency. The Amendment prohibited nothing more,
or at least the sources mention nothing more. The Self-Incrimination Clause neither
mandated an accusatorial system nor afforded defendants a right to remain silent. It
focused upon improper methods of gaining information from criminal suspects.
Alschuler, supra note 94, at 2651-52 (footnotes omitted).
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Under today’s legal standards,209 Officer Chavez subjected Oliverio Martinez to
an improper method of interrogation; he used coercion to induce incriminating
statements that Martinez might have reasonably believed “could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.”210
Under the Court’s precedents, Officer Chavez’s methods were sufficient to
establish a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Thomas has indicated that
the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment is important when deciding
today’s cases.211 Ironically, in Chavez, he paid no attention to the fact that,
viewed from the Framers’ perspective, the Fifth Amendment focused on
improper methods of securing information from criminal suspects.212 Instead,
Justice Thomas employed a literal reading of the text to conclude that Martinez
had not stated a claim under the Fifth Amendment. There are multiple reasons
why the Court rejected a literal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment over a
century ago. The meaning of the text is far from clear; as written, the privilege
is susceptible to differing interpretations. Moreover, the bare terms of the
privilege “yield[] to no convenient formula.”213 Even Justice Harlan, a model
Supreme Court Justice for many conservatives, recognized the text cannot and
should not control how the Court interprets the Fifth Amendment.214 Certainly,
the members of the Chavez plurality understood that the Court’s precedents have
209 I agree with Alschuler’s judgment that our legal system and institutions are starkly
different from what the Framers lived under. Thus, “restoring the original understanding of
the Fifth Amendment privilege is impossible.” Alschuler, supra note 94, at 2667. Likewise,
“[t]he history of the privilege against self-incrimination provides only limited guidance in
resolving the Fifth Amendment issues that confront modern courts.” Id. at 2669. Finally, when
considering what influence the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment should have
when resolving modern legal controversies, it is important to recall that “[n]othing closely
resembling stationhouse interrogation occurred at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s
framing.” Id.; cf. John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American
Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 831 (1999) (“Crossing the
bridge between historical analysis and doctrinal reasoning can be a risky venture; changes in
institutions, practices, and surrounding legal rules make most moves from historical narrative
to contemporary legal interpretation exceedingly complicated. Thus, the history of a doctrine
can rarely, if ever, be relied on to lead to determinate conclusions about contemporary legal
questions.”).
210 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445.
211 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
213 McKay, supra note 7, at 194.
214 See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); supra note 153
and accompanying text. In another case, Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955), Justice
Harlan stated: “A valid claim of privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment has two requisites: (1) the privilege must be adequately invoked, and (2) a
possible answer to the question against which the privilege is asserted must have some
tendency to incriminate the person to whom the question is addressed,” id. at 203 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Martinez satisfied both requisites.
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repeatedly rejected a literal reading of the privilege to determine the scope and
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.215
What then, explains the reasoning behind Chavez? Perhaps members of the
Court worried that recognizing a claim for Martinez would allow terrorist
suspects, subjected to harsh and brutal interrogation techniques by government
officials, to bring lawsuits in federal court.216 While that concern may explain
some of the motivation behind the result in Chavez, I submit that the reasoning
of Chavez is propelled by a different and larger objective. The six Justices who
denied Martinez’s claim view the Fifth Amendment as a prophylactic protection,
and not a substantive constitutional right. I believe these Justices were
persuaded, in part, by the Solicitor General’s argument that the Fifth
Amendment does not control the actions of police officers.217 If the Fifth
Amendment does not control the conduct of officers in the field, then the
privilege does not bar the use of coercion to obtain a confession in every context,
but rather merely controls the use of statements in the courtroom. That is why
the Deputy Solicitor General told the Justices “the self-incrimination privilege
is unusual because it’s not purely and simply binding on the government. It
doesn’t say that in all contexts, the government cannot coerce confessions.”218
Under this logic, a coerced confession becomes constitutionally problematic
only when it is used in a criminal trial to help convict a person. If a compelled
statement is introduced or used at a criminal trial, the judiciary can intervene to
protect the values underlying the privilege by ordering suppression of the
statement, or reversing the conviction. Thus, the Fifth Amendment does not
provide a substantive right against government compulsion to induce
incriminating disclosures; rather, it is a prophylactic. This understanding, I
believe, explains Justice Thomas’s statement that “the privilege is a prophylactic
one,”219 and Justice Souter’s understanding that the Court is free to expand vel
non the “core of Fifth Amendment protection” depending on whether the
claimant has made a persuasive case.220
Of course, this view of the Fifth Amendment has disturbing consequences. As
recognized by Justice Breyer during the oral argument in Chavez, when the Fifth
Amendment is construed as merely prophylactic, there will be scenarios where
significant harm is incurred, but there is no constitutional basis for judicial
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See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
See Parry, supra note 22, at 838 (“Concerns about terrorism, unstated in the opinions
but on display in the briefs, feed the uncertainty of the middle and strengthen the hand of the
justices who would narrow the privilege and limit the scope of substantive due process.”).
217 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
218 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 20.
219 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 n.3 (2003) (plurality opinion).
220 See id. at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. Frantz, supra note 207, at
281 (stating Justice Thomas’s and Justice Souter’s opinions in Chavez recharacterized prior
Fifth Amendment “decisions as mere prophylactic protections for the privilege, rather than as
applications of the privilege itself”).
216
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intervention because under the reasoning of Chavez there has been no
constitutional injury.221 Imagine, for example, police violate the Fifth
Amendment by not giving Miranda warnings or by employing psychological
coercion to obtain a confession from an innocent suspect. State officials then use
the confession in a grand jury proceeding to indict this suspect, use the
confession to deny bail, and use the confession at a pretrial hearing to determine
whether the suspect should be tried in juvenile or adult court.222 In such a
scenario, as Justice Breyer recognized, a person might be detained before trial
“in jail for a week or a month and he’s been hurt, all right.”223 But, if criminal
charges are later dismissed, one can argue that the innocent suspect has suffered
no Fifth Amendment violation because his compelled statement was never used
in a courtroom setting.224 Moreover, interpreting the Fifth Amendment as a
prophylactic does nothing for the person envisioned in Justice Kennedy’s
hypotheticals presented at the beginning of this Article.225 Physically abusing a
suspect to obtain a confession—or a judge’s order in a civil case holding a
witness, who asserts a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, in contempt and
confined until the witness testifies—involves no Fifth Amendment violation
under the logic of Chavez.226 During the oral argument in Chavez, Justice Breyer
221

See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 22-23 (“But there are a set of cases
where it will hurt people. The set of cases where it will hurt people is where because [the
police] violated Miranda but didn’t beat him up, and got a statement, they kept him jail. . . .
So there he is in jail for a week or a month and he’s been hurt, all right.”).
222 See Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 425 (9th Cir. 2010).
223 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 23.
224 See, e.g., Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right which can be violated only at
trial, even though pre-trial conduct by law enforcement officials may ultimately impair that
right.” (citing Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767 (plurality opinion)); Renda v. King 347 F.3d. 550, 559
(3d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is the use of coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not in
obtaining an indictment, that violates the Constitution.”). But see Stoot v. City of Everett, 582
F.3d 910, 924 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Where . . . a suspect’s criminal prosecution was not only
initiated, but was commenced because of her allegedly unwarned confession, the ‘criminal
case’ contemplated by the Self-Incrimination Clause has begun.” (quoting Sornberger v. City
of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2006)); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161,
173 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “[arrestee’s] initial appearance . . . was part of the criminal
case against [him]”).
225 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
226 When posing this latter hypothetical, Justice Kennedy may have been thinking about
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975). In Maness, the Court addressed whether in a civil
hearing a lawyer may be held in contempt for advising his client in good faith not to produce
subpoenaed materials (allegedly obscene magazines) on the ground that the materials may
incriminate the client. Id. at 458. The Court ruled that the lawyer may not be penalized even
though his advice caused the client to disobey the court’s order. Id. at 465-66. The Maness
Court explained that the Fifth Amendment “would be drained of its meaning” if a lawyer
“could be penalized for advising his client in good faith to assert it.” Id. Although the lawyer’s
client was also held in contempt and fined for refusing to produce the court-ordered materials,
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seemed worried that the result in Chavez would also decide these hypothetical
cases.227 Breyer was correct; Chavez’s logic means that no Fifth Amendment
violation occurred in these scenarios.
Although reading the Fifth Amendment as a prophylactic (rather than a
constitutional right) entails the harm described above, from another perspective,
interpreting the Fifth Amendment as merely prophylactic means that the Court
can “rein in the privilege by transforming large parts of current doctrine into
prophylactic rules that may be subject to congressional override”228 or judicial
overruling.229 Ultimately, I believe, the aim of Justice Thomas’s opinion was to
reshape Fifth Amendment doctrine. Other scholars have recognized that the
reasoning of Chavez can significantly influence how the privilege is interpreted
in future cases.230 While Justices Thomas and Souter insisted that precedent
commanded their interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, this is incorrect. The
reasoning of the six Justices “enunciates a new approach with real implications

the Court in Maness did not address the validity of the contempt penalty imposed on the client.
Id. at 455 n.5. Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical poses the issue left open in Maness: Would
holding a witness in a civil case—who has a valid Fifth Amendment privilege—in contempt
and confined until the witness testifies, violate the Fifth Amendment?
227 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 23 (“I don’t know if we should⎯it
seems to me what we’re going to decide in this case is effectively going to decide that.”).
228 Parry, supra note 22, at 837.
229 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009). The Court overruled Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), in Montejo, 556 U.S. at 797. Jackson had ruled that, under the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, police are barred from initiating interrogation of a criminal
defendant once he has requested counsel at an arraignment. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. The
Jackson Court essentially applied its prior ruling in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
to the Sixth Amendment context. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. In Edwards, a Fifth
Amendment case, the Court ruled that under Miranda, police are forbidden from initiating
questioning of an arrestee after the arrestee has invoked his right to counsel during custodial
interrogation. Id. at 484-85. A later case, Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990),
extended the Edwards rule to scenarios where an arrestee had actually consulted with counsel,
id. at 151-52. In explaining why Jackson should be overruled, Justice Scalia, the author of
Montejo, noted the “prophylactic protection” provided by Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick,
and stated that “[t]hese three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient” to protect the constitutional
rights of persons subjected to police interrogation. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 794-95.
230 See, e.g., Frantz, supra note 207, at 279-80 (“By focusing the privilege on the use at
trial of compelled statements at trial, Chavez has a potentially significant impact on the
privilege.”); cf. Marvin Zalman, Reading the Tea Leaves of Chavez v. Martinez: The Future
of Miranda, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 299, 332 (2004) (“A closer examination of Chavez discloses
fault lines in the Court’s understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege that will
undoubtedly come into play in its [then] anticipated decisions in Seibert and Patane.”);
Geoffrey B. Fehling, Note, Verdugo, Where’d You Go?: Stoot v. City of Everett and
Evaluating Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Civil Liability Violations, 18 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 481, 484 (2011) (“The aftermath of Chavez is unclear, leaving courts to attempt to
protect the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional guarantees without exercising too much
discretion in interpreting the scope of constitutional rights.” (footnote omitted)).
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for the future.”231 Justice Thomas in particular has not been afraid to take bold
steps in order to change constitutional doctrine, especially constitutional rules
announced by whom he perceived to be liberal Justices. According to one report,
“Thomas is laying the ground work for opinions that may be outliers now, but
could plant seeds for the future.”232 But, as demonstrated within a year of the
Court’s decision, Chavez is no outlier.
In United States v. Patane,233 Justice Thomas relied on Chavez to reverse a
ruling requiring suppression of a gun found after a suspect, who had been
arrested and interrogated without the provision of Miranda warnings, and
incriminated himself during the interrogation.234 Justice Thomas wrote for a
plurality of the Court in Patane when he explained that “a mere failure to give
Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or
even the Miranda rule.”235 According to Justice Thomas, it follows from this
proposition that police do not violate the Fifth Amendment or Miranda by
negligent or even deliberate failures to provide Miranda warnings: “Potential
violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into
evidence at trial. And, at that point, ‘[t]he exclusion of unwarned
statements . . . is a complete and sufficient remedy’ for any perceived Miranda
violation.”236 What case supports this understanding of Fifth Amendment law?
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Frantz, supra note 207, at 280.
Ariane de Vogue, Clarence Thomas’ Supreme Court Legacy, CNN: POLITICS (Oct. 22,
2016, 10:06 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/22/politics/clarence-thomas-supreme-court25-years/ [https://perma.cc/36HQ-QCTF]. This same story quotes Ken Blackwell and Ken
Klukowski, two conservative pundits, stating that “Justice Thomas is writing for history.” Id.
233 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
234 Id. at 634-35 (plurality opinion).
235 Id. at 641. Of course, after years of stating that Miranda was merely a prophylactic rule
and not required by the Constitution, in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the
Court disavowed these statements and held that Miranda “announced a constitutional rule,”
and thus, could not be overturned by a congressional statute, id. at 444. As one observer has
noted, although the Dickerson dissenters (Justices Scalia and Thomas) conceded that
characterizing or viewing the Miranda doctrine as prophylactic “might have rendered
Miranda jurisprudence coherent, they rejoiced in the Court’s failure to rely on it because,
believing that such prophylaxis was an ‘immense and frightening antidemocratic power [that]
does not exist,’ they suggested that ‘incoherence [might be] the lesser evil.’” The Supreme
Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 248, 301 (2004) (alterations in
original). In Patane, Justice Thomas stated “the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to
protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 636. Thus,
“Patane revealed that the Dickerson dissenters, eschewing their own rhetoric that
‘incoherence [might be] the lesser evil,’ have fulfilled their own prophecy.” The Supreme
Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, supra, at 301 (footnote omitted). For a meticulous critique
of Patane, see Yale Kamisar, Tribute, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the
2004 Miranda “Poisoned Fruit” Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 97 (2004).
236 Patane, 542 U.S. at 641-42 (alteration in original) (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 790 (2003)).
232

1084

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1047

Justice Thomas cites Chavez. The future will reveal what further impact Chavez
will have on the Fifth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Considering the Self-Incrimination Clause, then-Chief Judge Magruder of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit wrote, “[o]ur forefathers,
when they wrote this provision into the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
had in mind a lot of history which has been largely forgotten to-day.”237 In
Chavez, not only did Justice Thomas ignore “a lot of history,” he also failed to
heed the admonition that “the history of the privilege establishes . . . that it is not
to be interpreted literally.”238 Justice Thomas had other concerns. The history of
the Fifth Amendment and the Court’s precedents were obstacles to Justice
Thomas’s goal of transforming the Self-Incrimination Clause from a substantive
right into a judge-made prophylactic rule. When Justice Stevens complained that
Justice Thomas’s opinion was “fundamentally flawed” because “it incorrectly
assumes that coercive interrogation is not unconstitutional when it occurs
because it merely violates a judge-made ‘prophylactic’ rule,”239 Justice Thomas
offered no rebuttal. Perhaps, Justice Thomas’s silence to this complaint suggests
that Justice Stevens correctly diagnosed what Justice Thomas was doing:
transforming the Self-Incrimination Clause from a substantive right into a judgemade prophylactic rule.
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Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954).
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 788-89 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

